|
2-1 |
Evidence of "Conscious Parallelism" at Canada's Top
Three Banks |
|
2-2 |
Evidence of a "Credit Crunch" at Canada's Top Three
Banks: Cash Resources Per Share�In Current and in Constant
1986 Dollars |
|
2-3 |
Empirical Evidence of Substantial Increase in the
Perniciousness of the North American Marketplace: Per-Capita Mortality of Businesses in
the U.S. (1966-1996), Canada (1966-1996), and Japan (1980-1992), Compared |
|
3-1 |
Expert System Logic Diagram: Input Evidences and Conclusions |
|
3-2 |
Effects of an Increasingly Darwinistic Environment on Sound
Funding-Limited Firms: Probability that the Firm Is Destabilized and Destroyed after the
Bank Reduces, Freezes, or Calls its Loan vs. The Strength of the Evidences |
|
5-1 |
Sensitivity Analysis: Effect of a 10% Reduction in the
Sensitivity of the Rules on Conclusions |
|
5-2 |
Specificity Analysis: Effect of a 10% Reduction in the
Specificity of the Rules on Conclusions |
|
5-3 |
Sensitivity of the Subjective Probability that the Firm is
Destabilized and Destroyed, after the Bank Tightens its Credit or Calls its Loan, to the
Validity of the Rules (Type 2 Uncertainty) �0%�P(C|E)�100%
and 0%�P(C|-E)�50%.
The Strength of the Input Evidences is Assumed to be 100% |
|
5-4 |
Sensitivity of the Subjective Probability that the Firm is
Destabilized and Destroyed, after the Bank Tightens its Credit or Calls its Loan, to the
Strength of the Evidences (Type 1 Uncertainty) and to the Validity of the Rules (Type 2
Uncertainty)�50%�P(C|E)�100% and P(C|-E)=0% |
|
5-5 |
Sensitivity of the Subjective Probability that the Firm is
Destabilized and Destroyed, after the Bank Tightens its Credit or Calls its Loan, to the
Strength of the Evidences (Type 1 Uncertainty) and to the Validity of the Rules (Type 2
Uncertainty)�P(C|E)=100% and 0%�P(C|-E)�50% |
|
5-6 |
Sensitivity of the Subjective Probability that the Firm is
Destabilized and Destroyed, after the Bank Tightens its Credit or Calls its Loan, to the
Strength of the Evidences (Type 1 Uncertainty) and to the Validity of the Rules (Type 2
Uncertainty)�P(C|E)=90% and 0%�P(C|-E)�50% |
|
5-7 |
Sensitivity of the Subjective Probability that the Firm is
Destabilized and Destroyed, after the Bank Tightens its Credit or Calls its Loan, to the
Strength of the Evidences (Type 1 Uncertainty) and to the Validity of the Rules (Type 2
Uncertainty)�P(C|E)=80% and 0%�P(C|-E)�50% |
|
5-8 |
Sensitivity of the Subjective Probability that the Firm is
Destabilized and Destroyed, after the Bank Tightens its Credit or Calls its Loan, to the
Strength of the Evidences (Type 1 Uncertainty) and to the Validity of the Rules (Type 2
Uncertainty)�P(C|E)=70% and 0%�P(C|-E)�50% |
|
5-9 |
Sensitivity of the Subjective Probability that the Firm is
Destabilized and Destroyed, after the Bank Tightens its Credit or Calls its Loan, to the
Strength of the Evidences (Type 1 Uncertainty) and to the Validity of the Rules (Type 2
Uncertainty)�P(C|E)=60% and 0%�P(C|-E)�50% |
|
5-10 |
Sensitivity of the Subjective Probability that the Firm is
Destabilized and Destroyed, after the Bank Tightens its Credit or Calls its Loan, to the
Strength of the Evidences (Type 1 Uncertainty) and to the Validity of the Rules (Type 2
Uncertainty)�P(C|E)=50% and 0%�P(C|-E)�50% |
|
6-1 |
Madness in Capitalism: A Model of the Unhealthy Economic Soul�Based on Hegel's Philosophy of Mind and
Hegel's
Phenomenology of Spirit |
|
8-1 |
The Biophilosophical Foundations of Capitalism: Progression
of the Rule of Law |
